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ABSTRACT

Structured overlay networks are primarily used in data storage and data lookup,
but they are vulnerable against many kinds of attacks. Within the realm of security,
overlay networks have demonstrated applicability in providing privacy, availability,
integrity, along with scalability. The thesis first analyses the Chord and the SALSA
protocols which are organized in structured overlays to provide data with a certain degree
of privacy, and then defines a new protocol called Spherical Chord which provides data
lookup with privacy, while also being scalable, and addresses critical existing weaknesses
in Chord and SALSA protocols. Spherical Chord is a variant of the Chord, and utilizes
the concept of distributed hash table (DHT). Chord sends packets uni-directionally over a
virtual id space in the overlay. While this feature provides lower latencies, it can be used
by attackers to misroute and drop packets. Spherical Chord protocol introduces additional
connections in the structured overlay and increases the path length and the number of
paths for sending messages, hence making it more resilient to routing attacks. A new
protocol focusing for constructing the Spherical Chord, followed by a new lookup
protocol is defined in this thesis. The protocols are analyzed and it is demonstrated using
both theoretical analysis and simulations that improved path availability helps in
maintaining privacy, while also limiting the impact of routing attacks.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Structured overlay peer to peer networks have found wide applicability today in
distributed content management [8]. Numerous protocols have been designed for overlay
networks in the realm of creation of nodes, organization of nodes and lookup of a
particular node [4, 7, 11, 16]. The structure of the network and protocol should be designed
such that there are no single points of failures, and there is good load balance among all
nodes during network operation. Beyond just content lookup, other critical requirements
of structured overlays today include scalability, privacy and integrity. In this thesis, we
define a new type of structured overlay peer to peer network called Spherical Chord
which is a look up service that provides a high degree of availability, scalability, privacy
and integrity, while being resilient to a number of malicious attacks.

During communication over a network, unless security and privacy mechanisms
are in place, the browser typically advertises the IP address, the domain, platform and the
information which is requested. Such critical data could be out on the network and can be
easily monitored and mishandled by attackers. Thus, privacy on the network can be
compromised. Overlay peer to peer networks provide elegant solutions to protect privacy
on the network. The nature of peer to peer communication means that typically, it is
harder for an adversary to identify which nodes are sources and destinations of messages,
and which nodes are mere forwarders.
Existing overlay networks like Tor [4] and Tarzan [3, 11] encrypt data across servers
and create anonymous circuits. These systems rely on the communication of messages
among a small set of randomly selected forwarders. However, when the number of nodes
increases, the systems faces scalability issues from overhead and maintenance.
Furthermore, these protocols are unstructured in nature, in the sense that there is a high
degree of randomness in nodes choosing forwarders. This feature hence compromises
availability. To circumvent this problem, structured overlays were introduced wherein the
nodes in the overlay are arranged following a well-defined structure that is appropriately
leveraged during routing. The presence of a well-defined structure improves availability,
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while the presence of multiple intermediate forwarders to route messages improves
privacy. Two of the well-known protocols in this realm are Chord [7] and SALSA
(Structured Approach to Large Scale Anonymity) [16]. In Chord, nodes are arranged in a
circular space with virtual identities, and routing proceeds in the circle uni-directionally
during look-ups. SALSA is another protocol wherein nodes are arranged in a binary tree
structure and messages are routed along the tree in a well-defined manner in reaching the
correct destination. Both systems typically route a message in log (N) hops, where N is
the number of nodes in the network. Unfortunately though, both systems suffer from poor
performance in the presence of attacks that severely degrade privacy and availability, as
we discuss subsequently.

In this thesis, we define a new kind of structured overlay network called Spherical
Chord, which is a look up service. However, compared to the existing Chord and SALSA
protocols, it provides multiple paths to route a message in the overlay, while still
retaining the advantages of maintaining a structure during routing. As we demonstrate
subsequently, Spherical Chord provides a high degree of availability, scalability, privacy
and integrity, while being resilient to a number of malicious attacks.

3
2. RELATED CONCEPTS

2.1. OVERLAY NETWORK
An overlay network is defined as a separate “logical” network on top of the
physical network. Overlay networks can be structured or unstructured. In structured
overlay networks, the construction and maintenance of the network follows a welldefined structure, while in unstructured networks, there is a high degree of randomness
during construction and maintenance. Overlay networks can also be centralized with
some nodes performing more duties that other nodes or they can also be decentralized
and distributed, wherein there is a very high degree of load balance along all nodes.
Overlay networks like Napster [19] and Gnutella [18] are unstructured and centralized, while
networks like are CAN [14], SALSA [16] and Chord [7] are structured and decentralized. All
of these protocols provide lookup services, and each has its own strengths and
weaknesses from lookup perspectives. More recently though, the issue of security and
privacy are assuming critical significance in overlay networks. In overlay networks, since
there are typically a large number of nodes, controlling access to only honest nodes
become impossible. How to provide routing services in the presence of malicious nodes,
while still providing a high degree of availability and scalability is hence a major
challenge today. With the large number of nodes in the overlay, and in the presence of
heavy network traffic, recent studies are also exploring the applicability of overlay
networks for providing privacy preserved communications as well [7, 16].

2.2. DISTRIBUTED HASH TABLE (DHT)
Distributed Hash Tables are a generalized concept, wherein keys are distributed to
nodes in a manner that attempts to distribute the assignments of keys to nodes in a
uniform manner [9]. Any participating node in the DHT can now efficiently retrieve the
value associated with any given key. DHTs also ensure load balancing in the sense that
the responsibility for maintaining the mapping from keys to values is now purely
distributed among the nodes. This also ensures that a change in the set of participants
(when nodes join and leave) causes a minimal amount of disruption, hence enhancing
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scalability. DHTs recently have been used in a number of applications including,
cooperative Web caching, distributed file systems, domain name services, instant
messaging, multicast, and also peer-to-peer file sharing and content distribution systems.
While there are multiple techniques that can be used to generate DHTs, consistent
hashing is one of the standard approaches, and is discussed next.
2.3. CONSISTENT HASHING
In consistent hashing both the node and the key are typically hashed using the
same hash function, and is widely used for designing DHTs. In addition to balancing
assignment of nodes to keys, consistent hashing provides significant benefits to
maintenance of the network during the node join and node delete operations.
Consistent hashing maps the nodes and keys to a randomly distributed, “identifier
points” on the circle. After hashing the system needs to find where a key should be
assigned. Each node is responsible for the key which precedes itself in the identifier
space. The result is that each node contains all the keys located between its identifier
point and the previous node’s identifier point.
If a node leaves the network then the requests for the key associated with it would
be mapped to the next highest point in the identifier space. Since each node is associated
with many pseudo-randomly distributed identifier points, the keys that were held by that
node will now be map to different nodes.
A similar process occurs when a node is added. By adding a node, we assign keys
to the new node which is succeeding the key in the identifier space. These keys will no
longer be associated with the previous node, and any value previously stored there will
not be found by the lookup method. The lookup request would now be directed to new
node responsible for a particular key [9, 10].
With this design, if a node joins or leaves the network then only O (K/N) nodes
are responsible for making changes to their routing tables where K is the number of keys
and N is the number of nodes in the network. Consequently in a network with N number
of nodes and K keys, each node is responsible for at most (K/N) keys [8].

5
3. THE CHORD LOOKUP PROTOCOL

In this section, we first illustrate the Chord protocol for scalable lookup services
in large scale networks, and a discussion of privacy features in Chord.
3.1. CHORD IDENTIFIER CIRCLE
The Chord protocol uses the concept of DHT and consistent hashing for efficient
lookup operation. In the Chord protocol, the keys are assigned to the node in the
following way. An identifier circle is created and the identifiers are placed in a
modulo structure circle. Key k is assigned to a node whose identifier is equal to or
succeeds k in the identifier space. This is done using the function successor (k), also
called as the successor node. In totality the nodes are arranged in a circular fashion from
0 to

-1. The successor node of key k is the first node that is followed by k in a

clockwise direction [7]. If a node n joins the network, then all the keys assigned to its
successor would be now assigned to node n. If a node n leaves the network, then the
successor of node n would be responsible for all the keys. Thus, using consistent hashing
only a fraction of nodes would have the responsibility of updating the routing tables
during subsequent node join and delete operations. Figure 3.1 shows an example of an
identifier circle used in the Chord protocol.

Figure 3.1. An identifier circle with m=6, k=5 and n=10
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Figure 3.1 signifies an identifier circle with m=6. It therefore has total of
identifiers. The identifiers are from 0 to a maximum of 63 (

-1). The number of nodes

that are currently active in the overlay are shown in dots, and they are ten in number. The
number of keys are 5.
3.2. SCALABLE NODE LOOKUP
3.2.1. Finger Table. To increase the efficiency of simple node lookup, the Chord
protocol creates additional information for efficient lookup of a node. This information is
stored in the finger table. If m is the number of bits in the identifier, then each node n
maintains at least m entries in the finger table [7]. The

entry in the table at node n

contains the identity of the first node, s, that succeeds n by at least
circle, i.e., s=successor (n +
node s is called the

on the identifier

)), where 1 ≤i ≤m (and all arithmetic is modulo

). The

finger of node n and denotes it by n.finger[i].node. The definition

of the finger table is given as follows,

Table 3.1. Definition of the finger table
Notation

Definition

finger[k].start

(n + 2k-1) mod 2m

.interval

(finger[k].start, finger[k+1].start)

.node

First node >= n.finger[k].start

Successor

The next node on the identifier circle;
finger[1].node

Predecessor

The previous node on the identifier
circle

7
3.2.2. Lookup Protocol. We now present the Chord protocol for looking up a
key.

Figure 3.2. Finger Table for node 8.

The above figure shows the finger table for the propagation of a request
originating from node N8. The
successor (n +

entry of the finger table is given as finger[i] =

). In the scalable node localization, each node stores information of

only a maximum for log (N) nodes. For a particular lookup operation the entry of the
finger table is checked and propagated on basis of the pointers to the successor nodes.
When a key is looked up, the Chord protocol will route the message to that node in its
finger table, which is closest to the destination node in the virtual id space. Each node
that receives the message will repeat the process until the destination node that stores the
key is reached. The algorithm is as follows,
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//ask node n to find the key (k)
n.find_successor(k)
if (k in (n,successor])
return successor;
else
n‘ = closest_preceding_node(k);
return n‘.find_successor(k);
//search the local table for the highest predecessor of k
n.closest_preceding_node(k);
for i=m downto 1 do
if (finger[i] in (n,k))
return finger[i];
return n;

With this algorithm, a lookup in Chord will take O (log N) messages to find a
destination, where N is the number of nodes in the system.

Figure 3.3. Lookup operations for Key (54).

9
Figure 3.3 shows an example of a lookup operation where K54 is looked up by
node N8. N56 stores the key K54 and thus is the target node. The figure demonstrates that
using the finger table for node N8, a long hop will be taken to node N42 as it is the node
which is closest to the target node N56. Consequently smaller hops are taken and the
destination N56 is reached.

3.3. PRIVACY IN CHORD
Although not intended, Chord does provide a certain degree of privacy due to its
inherent nature of using forwarder nodes to route messages. Privacy in Chord protocol is
closely related to the method in which a particular request is routed. In the Chord
protocol, the lookup requests are forwarded among the nodes. On account of this request
propagation the identity of the requestor node or the target node is not revealed as they
will appear to be no different from the initiator or target of a message in the virtual
identifier space during routing [1].
The Chord structure however exposes a weakness when the presence of malicious
nodes increases in the network. In the Chord protocol the requests from any particular
initiator to a particular target go through the same set of nodes, which are then in a
position to modify more than one request if they are malicious [12]. Furthermore requests
from multiple initiators are likely to converge on nodes closer to the target in the virtual
identifier space, and if some of these are malicious, then any request to that particular
target will all be dropped, hence severely limiting Chord’s ability to provide availability
to the nodes [2, 13]. As mentioned earlier, the problem is exacerbated due to uni-directional
routing in Chord.
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4. THE SALSA PROTOCOL

The SALSA (Structured Approach to Large Scale Anonymity) network
architecture also uses the distributed hash table (DHT) and consistent hashing The
SALSA architecture organizes the node in a "Chord" like identifier space, but employs a
binary tree like structure to organize nodes into groups. The node is said to belong in a
group if it is in that group's identifier space [16]. On basis of this concept the SALSA
protocol divides the network into local and global contacts. Each node has a local contact
table where it stores the ID of itself and other nodes in the same group. Similarly each
node has a global contact table where it stores a single contact for each level of the binary
tree [24].
4.1. LOOKUP PROCEDURE
Let us consider an initiator node, Q, which looks for a target key. The query node
Q selects R neighboring local contacts which fall under the same group. Node Q requests
each of the nodes in that particular group to find the owner of the target key. Each node
in the neighboring group of R nodes independently finds the owner of the key in the
SALSA virtual binary tree. The R neighboring nodes send the location of the target node
back to the query node Q. Now query node Q calculates the distance from itself to the
target and chooses one with the minimum distance (in the event of malicious lookup
returns). If the target node is within predefined distance bounds, it forms an anonymous
circuit to the target node. Figure 4.1 shows a typical binary tree structure of SALSA.
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Figure 4.1. Binary tree structure of SALSA, where G0 to G7 are groups

SALSA lookups the message and performs better than Chord on account of
sending redundant messages across the groups. Thus even if some nodes are malicious
and drop requests, there are alternate good nodes to route the message successfully. The
analytical model of SALSA shows that the probability to find the lookup initiator can be
calculated as follows

.

(1)

In the above expression, f is the fraction of malicious nodes in the network and l is
given as the number of redundant lookups. This expression suggests when the number of
nodes in the system increases, then the redundant messages also increases thereby
increasing the probability of locating the initiator

[2]

. Furthermore the redundant lookup

requests also travel through mostly same set of paths to reach the target node. If there are
malicious nodes along that path then probability of locating the initiator also increases.
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5. SPHERICAL CHORD

In this section, we present a new protocol that extends the Chord protocol, while
providing a much higher degree of privacy and availability compared to Chord and
SALSA. This protocol consists of many Chord rings to form a spherical structure and
thus, denoted as Spherical Chord.
5.1. ATTACK MODEL
To evaluate the privacy and availability of the Spherical Chord protocol, we have
defined an attack model to analyze the system and demonstrate its properties. The attacks
that are considered are as follows,


Dropping Lookup Requests: This is a denial of service attack. In this type of
attack, when a malicious node receives a packet for a particular request, it will
drop that particular packet [5].



Randomly Misrouting Packets: In this type of attack the malicious node does not
drop the packet but simply routes the lookup requests to a different node
randomly. By doing this, the malicious node makes the lookup query to take a
different path so that it never actually reaches the destination, or reaches it quite
late after too many hops. This kind of attack is difficult to detect, since the
requests per se are not dropped, but rather re-routed, which may happen under
node dynamics like joins and leaves [6].



Performing a Sub-ring Attack: This type of attack is salient to Spherical Chord,
and itself is a novel contribution. In this attack, groups of malicious nodes
collaborate so that the lookup request does not reach the destination. Here the
attackers have two types of finger tables - one which is correct, and the other
which contains the successor node entries of the malicious nodes. When the
lookup request is received, the malicious node will use its finger table and make
the lookup request propagate across the malicious nodes and it will finally reach a
malicious destination. Here the malicious nodes collaborate and give an
impression that they are propagating the request, but ultimately it will give us an
incorrect target destination [6, 15].
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5.2. CONSTRUCTION OF SPHERICAL CHORD
In Spherical Chord, multiple rings are constructed to place virtual identifiers in
the overlay space, and rings are connected via carefully chosen interlocking nodes.
Messages can traverse in the Spherical Chord within the ring and across rings by
traversing through interlocking nodes. With this arrangement, nodes have multiple routes
to send messages, hence improving availability, while the nature of using intermediate
forwarders provides a high degree of privacy.

Figure 5.1. Spherical Chord Structure. (N=512). Interlocking nodes are from 0 to 9.

If there are N nodes in the network then the r rings which will be formed for
communication in Spherical Chord, is defined as

r = ((log N)/2) +1

(2)
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The identities of the interlocking nodes in each ring are as follows,

0 and ((log N)/2) + 1 (Ring 0)
1 and ((log N)/2) + 2 (Ring 1)

((log N)/2) and log N (Ring r)

Figure 5.1 shows the left hand side cross section of the spherical structure. Here
each ring is highlighted with a different color.

The rings and the interlocking nodes in Figure 5.1 are as follows


Ring 0 has interlocking nodes 0 and 5.



Ring 1 has interlocking nodes 1 and 6.



Ring 2 has interlocking nodes 2 and 7.



Ring 3 has interlocking nodes 3 and 8.



Ring 4 has interlocking nodes 4 and 9.

This configuration is based on equation 2. Since the number of rings increases
with increase in the number of nodes, the path for a particular lookup also increases and
privacy and availability will be maintained. This is further explained in the following
sections.
5.3. LOOKUP IN SPHERICAL CHORD
When a lookup is initiated, the number of hops required to communicate with a
node is related to the interlocking nodes and also the non-interlocking nodes. If a node in
one ring wants to communicate with other ring's interlocking node, it takes a maximum
of 2*O (log N) hops. If node in one ring wants to communicate with another ring's node,
the number of hops required would be 3*O (log N), where N is the number of nodes in
the network.
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As demonstrated in Figure 5.2, if a node marked in red wants to communicate
with an interlocking node, it has to communicate to the outer ring and there are two paths
of communication available corresponding to the number of rings. Thus, for this
particular lookup operation the path length is given as 2*O (log N). Figure 5.2 illustrates
that if a node in ring 1 wants to communicate with the interlocking node of ring 3, then it
has to first communicate to the outer ring. There are two paths available for the lookup.
The first being, the node can look up to node 1 for the outer ring and then communicate
to node 3. The other path will be, the node looks up to node 6 and then to node 3. Thus
the path length for a lookup to an interlocking node is 2*O (log N).

Figure 5.2. Spherical Chord Structure. (N=512). Interlocking nodes are from 0 to 9.
Lookup is for interlocking nodes
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The most frequent case is when nodes in one ring would communicate with nodes
in another ring. If the other node is not an interlocking node then the path length
increases. As presented in Figure 5.3 If a node in ring 1 wants to communicate with a
node in the ring 2 which is a non-interlocking node, then the number of paths required
would be 3*O (log N) hops. The node would first communicate to ring 0 through the
interlocking node 1. Through this ring 0, it would find the interlocking node through
which it can communicate to the other ring, which in our case is node 2. For that
interlocking node the lookup request is initiated to the target node. Thus for this lookup
operation the path availability increases, and the path length for communication along
non - interlocking nodes is 3*O (log N).

Figure 5.3. Spherical Chord Structure (N=512). Interlocking nodes are from 0 to 9.
Lookup is for non-interlocking nodes
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5.4. FINGER TABLE MODIFICATION IN SPHERICAL CHORD
The new protocol has significant modifications to the traditional Chord finger
table. We have included the flags for the interlocking nodes, as they are the medium of
communication with the other rings. Table 5.1 shows the definition of the new Spherical
Chord finger table. In this table the interlockingFlag will be updated if the node acts as
an interlocking node. The protocol also has a ringNumber associated with the nodes,
which acts as a reference to the interlocking definition table.

Table 5.1. Definition of the Spherical Chord finger table
Notation

Definition

finger[k].start

( n + 2k-1) mod 2m

.interval

(finger[k].start, finger[k+1].start)

.node

First node >= n.finger[k].start

Successor

The next node on the identifier circle;
finger[1].node

Predecessor

The previous node on the identifier
circle

interlockingFlag

true or false(Boolean)

ringNumber

Ring number of the node
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The table 5.2 is the interlocking definition table developed for Spherical Chord. It
consists of ringNumber, which signifies the number of the ring to which the node
belongs. The nodesList mentioned in the table is the list of all the nodes which act as the
interlocking nodes associated with that particular ringNumber. This table will be
primarily used when running the stabilization algorithm for node join and delete
operations.

Table 5.2. Interlocking Definition table.
Notation
ringNumber

Definition
The number of the ring
to

which

the

node

belongs
nodesList

List containing the nodes
as

the

interlocking

nodes.

5.5. STABILIZATION ALGORITHM
Nodes can join and leave the system. Our stabilization algorithm for Spherical
Chord focuses on the interlocking nodes as they are basis of communication among
Chord rings. For example, if an interlocking node joins the system, then the node sets its
interlockingFlag as true in Spherical Chord finger table. This new node should also be
added to the list containing the interlocking nodes in the interlocking definition table.

We develop the stabilization algorithm which keeps the pointers for the successor
nodes and predecessor nodes updated, along with proper configuration of the interlocking
nodes. The pointers to the nodes and the interlocking nodes should be kept updated in the
Spherical Chord finger table as well as the interlocking definition table.
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The stabilization algorithm which specifically works during node join and delete
operations is as follows,

n.join (n')
predecessor=nill;
successor=n'.find_successor (n);
//obtain the node's successor
n.stabilize();
x=successor.predecessor;
if (x ε (n, successor))
successor=x;
successor.notify(n);
//if n is the interlocking node
x=successor.predecessor;
if (x ε (n, nodeList))
successor=x;
successor.interlockingFlag=true;
successor.notify(n);
successor.fixInterlockingTable();
//calculate the ring number
n.calculateRingNumber();
//n' thinks it might be a predecessor
n.notify(n');
if( predecessor is nill or n' ε(predecessor,n))
predecessor=n';
//periodically fix fingers in finger table
//periodically fix the interlocking definition table
n.fix_fingers();
n.fixInterlockingTable();
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When the stabilization algorithm successfully executes, a node will successfully
resolve a lookup request even during node join and delete operations as the pointers to
the nodes would be updated appropriately. Additionally, the interlocking definition table
would contain the correct list of interlocking nodes, which form the basis of
communication among different rings.
5.6. OVERHEAD IN SPHERICAL CHORD
The Spherical Chord runs a stabilization protocol and notifies both the finger table
and interlocking definition table of any update during node join and delete operations.
The additional computation required to notify the interlocking definition table increases
the overhead of the Spherical Chord protocol. This overhead is further increased with an
increase in the number of failed nodes in the network.

Let us consider a system of N nodes. The average path length for Chord is logN
and for Spherical Chord it is a maximum of 3*logN. Let k be the number of failed nodes
in the system, then the probability of the failed nodes on the path length is given as
follows,

Failed Node on a Path =

(3)

In our analysis, we have considered 1000 nodes in the system. Therefore, the
number of failed nodes on the path length in Spherical Chord is greater than the number
of failed nodes in the traditional Chord protocol. The graphical representation is shown in
Figure 5.4.
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Failed Nodes on Path

4
3.5
3
2.5
2
Chord

1.5

Spherical Chord

1
0.5
1
85
169
253
337
421
505
589
673
757
841
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Figure 5.4. Overhead in Spherical Chord

The above analysis shows that the overhead for the computation of stabilization
protocol will increase, as the probability of failed nodes on the lookup path increases.
However, we can overcome this overhead by an increase in the number of lookup paths
which subsequently increases the privacy of the network.
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6. ANALYSIS OF SPHERICAL CHORD

6.1. PATH LENGTH ANALYSIS OF SPHERICAL CHORD
The Spherical Chord protocol is analyzed with the traditional Chord and SALSA
protocols. The concluding results related to path length are shown. The initial conclusion
is that the path length of the Spherical Chord is greater than the traditional system. Our
system has a greater path length when a lookup is initiated. However, latency resulting
out of greater path length is balanced out by the increase in the number of paths. In Chord
protocol there is only a single direction in which lookup requests are routed and the
requests converge towards the target node. Malicious nodes take advantage of this
situation and drop the packets. However, in Spherical Chord when a lookup is initiated
multiple paths can be chosen and that would make our system more resilient against
routing attacks. Figure 6.1 shows the path length analysis of Spherical Chord.
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Figure 6.1. Path Length Analysis

6.2. PATH AVAILABILITY METRIC OF SPHERICAL CHORD
Path availability is defined as the number of paths available by Spherical Chord at
any time during a lookup operation. The following steps are taken in order to calculate
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the path availability metric of the Spherical Chord. Let the probability of a node failure
during a lookup operation be q. Timeout is defined as the total failure in the lookup
operation which is a function of the number of available paths [17]. Let c be the number of
nodes contacted during the lookup operation. Thus, the number of timeouts for one
lookup operation is c*q.

Path Availability metric =

(4)

The failure to find a node is thus reduced because of the increase in the number of

Timeouts/Total Path Available Failure

available paths in Spherical Chord. The graphical representation is given in figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2. Path Availability Metric

The result shows the failure recovery of Spherical Chord in comparison with
Chord. The reason for such an improvement is because at every lookup the protocol has
extra paths available. Thus, when a node fails in the lookup operation it has another path
available. The probability of failure for a particular lookup operation reduces as a result
of the extra paths that can be taken in the protocol.
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6.3. LOOKUP FAILURE ANALYSIS OF SPHERICAL CHORD
In Chord the requests follow only a single uni – directional route which makes it
susceptible to routing attacks. In SALSA redundant lookups are initiated to fight against
these attacks, however, these lookups follow the same set of predefined paths. In
Spherical Chord, multiple paths are present which reduces the effect of such attacks.
Thus, the probability of a lookup being captured by a malicious node is given as,
1−

(5)

In the formula, f is fraction of malicious nodes in the system. Here p is said to be
path length for the lookup operation. For the Chord protocol it is log N, and for the
Spherical Chord the path length is a maximum of 3*log N. The analysis is given as
follows,
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Figure 6.3. Lookup Failure Analysis of Spherical Chord

From Figure 6.3, it can be concluded that SALSA performs better than Chord.
However, Spherical Chord performs better when the malicious nodes in the system
increases because more paths are available the system becomes resilient against routing
attacks.
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7. CONCLUSIONS

Today privacy is becoming increasingly important in peer to peer based systems.
This thesis discusses the Chord and SALSA protocols which are used to lookup a data
item in a structured overlay network, while also providing a certain degree of privacy. A
new protocol is subsequently presented called the Spherical Chord which incorporates
more nodes and provides more paths to communicate, thereby enhancing privacy in data
lookup requests. Furthermore, the protocol is analyzed against numerous other routing
attacks and it is shown that an increase in the number of lookup paths also significantly
improves the availability of the system as well.
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